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One of the toughest challenges to ensure the emergence of collective intelligence and knowledge
production is to rightly set individual incentives towards the achievement of a common goal [Pickard
et al. 2011]. Unfortunately, most attempts to establish and maintain long-term collective action are
confronted with diverging individual incentives [Hardin 1968], and organizational issues [Ostrom
1990]. On the Internet, collective action is best embodied by open source software (OSS) and other
non-software knowledge production projects, like Wikipedia. Our current knowledge of OSS commu-
nities reveals how they achieve knowledge production in a seamless self-organized way called peer-
production, which relies on two fundamental organizational rules : (i) task self-selection and (ii) peer-
review [Benkler 2002]. Beyond these rules, the success or the failure of OSS projects is most often
bound to people’s capabilities to build true communities, through institutions that help solve the ten-
sions existing between individual incentives and the collective interest. Building and adapting insti-
tutions for open collaboration is often a hard and painful enterprise, which can put at stake the very
survival of an OSS project [O’Mahony and Ferraro 2007]. Here we present a mechanism design, based
on a Wiki-like collaboration platform coupled to a prediction market, which aligns individual incen-
tives with the goals of collective knowledge peer-production, and does not require further governance
mechanism. We have implemented and tested four instances of this system in the context of higher ed-
ucation for the courses Entrepreneurial Risks (ETH Zurich; Course No 351-0564-00L; instructor Didier
Sornette) in 2011, 2012, 2013, and Environmental Entrepreneurship (EPFL; instructor Marc Vogt) in
2013. Complementing business management experiences [Hoyt and Rao 2006; Benbya and Van Al-
styne 2011], this system explicitly formalizes the rules of peer-production. Most prediction markets
are designed to organize information rather than to engage individual knowledge production as a col-
lective good. Our implementation helps value not only information, but also individual and collective
behaviours, which are at the very roots of collective intelligence.
1. COUPLING COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION WITH A PREDICTION MARKET
Students start their contributions by posting ideas, which in turn further develop into projects, accord-
ing to the specific guidelines provided by the instructor.1 A virtual currency called Entrepreneurial
Risks Dollar (ER$) is issued and students are initially endowed with ER$ 10’000. Students are com-
pletely free to post as many new project ideas as they want. They can also contribute without restric-
tion to any existing project. For their contributions, they are rewarded in the following way: each 10
words (or 55 bytes) contributed are worth ER$ 100 of shares of the contributed project. For instance, if
a project stock value is ER$ 100, for every 10 words contributed one share is attributed. If the project
value is ER$ 200, for every ten words contributed half a share is attributed. On the contrary, if the
1Technically, a project corresponds to a page on a Wiki. All changes made by students to any page (i.e. any project) are par-
simoniously tracked over the course of the semester. Guidelines can encompass a specific topic or problem to solve, as well as
instructions on the required quality of the work.
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project value is ER$50, then for every ten words contributed, two shares are attributed, and so on. For
each new project, five shares (worth ER$ 500) are attributed to the original contributor. The shares
are subsequently traded and valued on the prediction market as a form of peer-review. To ensure equal
access to information, all contribution and prediction market records are accessible to everyone, in
the most transparent way. As they contribute to projects and trade on the prediction market, students
build a portfolio of stock holdings. The evolution of the portfolio provides a real-time indication of their
performance over the semester. To avoid a “beauty contest” problem [Keynes 1936], before the class
starts students are informed that their final grade will correspond to the value of their stock holdings
for each project weighted by their ex-post value, i.e. the final project score provided by the instructor.
In other words, while students can freely trade over the semester, their portfolio value is a reliable
predictor of their final grade, only if they are able to accurately anticipate the final ex-post judgement
by the instructor, and trade accordingly. In a nutshell, students should not trade according to their
expectations, but rather those of the instructor, which provides a kind of fundamental value anchor
similar to more standard education grading systems. This should also avoid the emergence of bubbles,
i.e. transient speculative behaviors that may be disconnected from the goal of our design.
2. RESULTS
The overall goal of coupling collective knowledge production with a prediction market is to recreate a
controlled environment of collective intelligence and knowledge production. As expected, we find that
our mechanism design is efficient to foster diversification of contributions and trading : students are
incentivized to sneak into projects – even if they do not make any major contribution, and do it overall
quite well (see Figure 1 panel A for a matrix representation of contributions across projects). We then
find that despite a low level of liquidity and sometimes a lack of counterparts for trading, the predic-
tion market does rather well in predicting the final ex-post scores. Finally, while students are given
metrics to readily measure their ex-ante score over the semester, we find, surprisingly, that some stu-
dents contribute orders of magnitude more than the average. This result is at odds with the rational
utility maximizer behavior we could expect from a mechanism design, which sets only extrinsic moti-
vations as incentives (i.e getting a good grade in this case). This result is however compatible with the
complicated mixture of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, driving open source software development
[von Krogh et al. 2012]. An anonymous survey conducted after the end of the class in 2012, as well
as informal discussions with students after they got their grades, confirms that motives go sometimes
far beyond just performing on the prediction market. This very encouraging result suggests that the
prediction market itself does not undermine intrinsic motivation, which is known to be critical for the
success of open source projects [von Krogh et al. 2012]. We also see that highly contributing students
have systematically more opportunities to compound on their work : as time passes, a clear pattern of
positive return of scale on score versus contributions develops (see Figure 1 panel B). Since all actions
are parsimoniously recorded and timestamped, we can trace back to the very detailed origins of these
stylized facts.
3. UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING SELF-ORGANIZED COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
While it is still at an early stage, this education project provides surprising insights on the emergence
of collective intelligence. We discuss some aspects and limitations relevant to the understanding of
underlying mechanisms, as well as for management and organization design. In the process of filter-
ing and organizing knowledge, peer-review plays a central role. We initially expected that students
would carefully review projects. It turns out that this is nearly impossible to do so, because projects
are in continuous, and often fast-paced, evolution. Thorough review is certainly not worth the effort,
and thus students engage instead into “quick and dirty” judgements on projects. Nevertheless, the
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Fig. 1. A. Amount of contributions in bytes (logarithmic scale) by students to projects, sorted by decreasing order of contribution
on both axes, with higher contribution on the bottom-left of the matrix. B. Scaling function of final score as a function of
contributions for years 2011 and 2012. The linear fit in double logarithmic scales with slope larger than 1, shows the positive
return of scale of final score as a function of contributions. The dots (resp. crosses) correspond to the ex-ante (resp. ex-post) final
score. The fits presented here are made on the ex-ante finale score.
prediction market does overall well. Why is it so ? On the one hand, students have multiple occasions
to judge a project, and they can do it with different levels of confidence by putting more or less shares
at stake. Therefore one or a few mistaken judgements – over several tens or hundreds market orders –
are not critical. Moreover, in any case, the judgement can only be an approximation the “true” value of
a project. On the other hand, prediction market transactions always involve at least two students who
have reached an agreement on the value of a project. This gives obviously much more strength to the
judgement. We wonder, however, how a project, addressing a truly technical and complicated problem,
could be evaluated efficiently by this sort of “wisdom of crowd”. It probably heavily depends on the skill
sets of all participants. Another insight for management is the powerful creative destruction process
at work : unsuccessful projects are quickly abandoned, and their value drops rapidly, because there is
only a limited amount of money in circulation that must be optimally invested on the market. There
is however a balancing effect, which helps “saving” potentially good, but undervalued projects : if the
stock market price drops, the amount of shares received per contribution unit increases, thus creating
incentives to contribute. On the contrary, if a project becomes highly valued, the amount of shares
distributed per contribution unit vanishes, thus reducing incentives to further modify the project. This
helps ensuring stability of more mature projects. Finally, we found that unfortunately this form of
collective knowledge production is little suited for the achievement of self-contained final reports. We
believe that fixing the editorial line requires intense work by a single contributor, which is dispropor-
tionate in comparison to average contributions we generally expect from students, and thus deters any
contributor to take on the task. This makes in turn final project grading more difficult for the instructor.
We have presented a mechanism design that helps replicate typical instances of collective intelli-
gence and knowledge production found on the Internet, in a controlled environment. While its ex-
perimentation and testing are still at an early stage, we anticipate that this mechanism design will
help further uncover detailed insights on underlying emerging and sustainable collective intelligence
mechanisms.
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